Abstract. We examine a logic that combines knowledge, awareness, and change of awareness. An agent can become aware of factual propositions but also of other agents or of herself. The dual operation to becoming aware, forgetting, can also be modelled. We show that the logic is decidable, and we present a complete axiomatization.
Introduction
Agents may be uncertain about the valuations of propositions, but they may also be unaware of these propositions. They may also become aware of propositions, and be aware or become aware of other agents. We find that there are many subtleties and intricacies involved in defining the semantics for such dynamics. In this paper we will discuss these intricacies and in doing so make the following contributions:
1. We will introduce a new form of model equivalence modulo the agents' awareness and uncertainty, called awareness bisimulation. 2. We will define a new type of knowledge, referred to as intrinsic knowledge.
Intrinsic knowledge is essential to express the dynamic interactions between awareness and knowledge. Implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge are definable. 3. As well as considering awareness of atomic propositions, we also consider awareness of agents. This allows us to model such concepts as self-awareness and speculation about an unknown adversary. 4. We will present operators for awareness change-both becoming aware and forgetting-and give semantics for these operators that are consistent with our intuitions of awareness and knowledge.
Our work is rooted in: the tradition of epistemic logic [11] and in particular multi-agent epistemic logic [13, 3] ; in various research since the 1980s on the interaction of awareness and knowledge [2, 14, 15, 9] -including a relation to recent works like [10, 6, 8] ; and in modal logical research in propositional quantification, starting in the 1970s with [4] and followed up by work on bisimulation quantifiers [19, 12, 5] .
Works treating awareness either follow a more semantically flavoured approach, where awareness concerns propositional variables in the valuation [2, 15, 9] , or a more syntactically flavoured approach. In the latter, awareness concerns all formulas of the language in a given set, in order to model 'limited rationality' of agents. It is (also) pursued in [2] and in recent work like [6] . We are straight into the semantic corner: within the limits of their awareness, agents are fully rational.
For the static part of the logical language we follow [2] . For the dynamic part, it is remarkable that levels of 'interactive unawareness' in [9] can be described in terms of the awareness bisimulation introduced in our work (at the end of our paper). The insights made clear in their paper were very motivating for us. Our work builds on that by the authors of [18, 17] . The latter focusses on a special case (public global awareness) of the current paper. The former shows that dynamics of awareness combine well with dynamics of knowledge (as in a true informative announcement where a novel issue is addressed); in this work we do not deal with that matter.
The paper contains the following sections: "Structures", "Language and Semantics", "Intrinsic, explicit and implicit knowledge", "Decidability", "Axiomatization and completeness", and "Comparison".
Structures
Given are a countably infinite set of propositional variables (facts) P and a countably infinite set of agents N . The sets P and N are disjoint. The union P ∪N is called the set of concepts. Propositional variables are named p, q, r, possibly indexed or quoted, and agent variables are named i, j, k, possibly indexed or quoted. For all sets X and Y and all x, write X + x for X ∪ {x}, write X − x for X \ {x}, write Y for X \ Y , and similarly x for X − x.
Definition 1 (Epistemic awareness model). An epistemic awareness model for N and P is a tuple M = (S, R, A, V ) that consists of a domain S of (factual) states (or 'worlds'), an accessibility function R : N → P(S × S), an awareness function A : N → S → P(P ∪ N ) and a valuation function V : P → P(S). For R(i) we write R i and for A(i) we write A i ; accessibility function R can be seen as a set of accessibility relations R i , and V as a set of valuations V (p). A pointed epistemic awareness model (M, s) is an epistemic awareness state.
The awareness function A may be varied to reflect different logics. The logic of public global awareness results if the value of A is the same for all agents and for all states. The logic of individual global awareness results if the awareness function is the same in all states, but may vary among agents. These logics are discussed in [17] . In this work we focus on the logic of individual local awareness where there are no constraints placed on the awareness function A. For the sake of generality we will assume no restrictions on the accessibility function R, either. However, for practical reasoning purposes we will often require the relation satisfies some simple properties (such as the reflexivity, transitivity etc.).
Further, given an arbitrary model M we will refer to the elements of the tuple
The property of awareness introspection [9] holds if all agents know when they are aware of a fact or of another agent: "If (s, t), (s, u) ∈ R i , then A i (t) = A i (u)." We make no commitment to awareness introspection.
Awareness bisimulation Consider the following scenario: in state s agent i is aware of agent j and of fact p, state u is accessible for agent i from state s, and in state u agent j is aware of fact p and also of fact q. That agent j is also aware of q in u should leave agent i indifferent, as she is not aware of q in s! This sort of similarity is captured in the following notion, named awareness bisimulation. Informally, given a model and a set of concepts (facts and agents) A ⊆ P ∪ N , another model is an A awareness simulation if it cannot be distinguished from the first by formulas consisting only of the concepts in A, and only in the scope of agents who are aware of those concepts.
Definition 2 (Awareness bisimulation). Let epistemic awareness models
The 'aware' clause can be considered as an additional 'atoms' requirement, only due to the nature of our models where states have more structure than merely factual truth. If we were to replace R[A ∩ A i (s)] in the back and forth clauses with R[A], we would have the definition of a standard (restricted) bisimulation over labelled transition structures [16] . (Restricted to P ′ and N ′ , for P ′ ∪ N ′ = A.) Thus every bisimulation is an awareness bisimulation. Vice versa, if all agents are aware of all concepts, the awareness bisimulation is a standard bisimulation (for the relations R i ). This is what we desire: we then revert to the standard multi-agent epistemic situation, where awareness plays no role. Proof. This can be seen by examining the Definition 2. The details are left to the reader. Definition 2 is more complex than the definition of standard bisimulation, however its motivation is very simple. Two worlds are A-awareness-bisimilar if, for any observer aware only of the concepts in A, the worlds appear identical. It gives us the "A-perspective" of a world. We also call it observational equivalence. Let that observer be agent i in state s, then her perspective is that of A i (s)-awareness-bisimilarity. We might also say that her view of the model is that of its R[A i (s)] equivalence class.
The crucial part of the definition is that in 'forth', in the requirement "(t, t ′ ) ∈ R[A ∩ A i (s)]", the bisimulation for state t is (further) restricted to the concepts visible for agent i in state s, the i-predecessor of t. (And similarly for 'back'.) An honoured principle (also in economics, and in artificial intelligence) is that incompleteness precedes uncertainty. The awareness function of an agent in a given state (incompleteness) determines what the agent can 'see' in all accessible states (uncertainty), and so on. This chaining of awareness is expressed with awareness bisimulation. This chaining requirement was present in epistemic awareness structures since its inception in [2] . We have merely employed it to the full and in the one and only way, for structural similarity.
Example In Figure 1 agent i is aware of p but unaware of q in state s. In the figure, names of states are followed, between parentheses, by values of facts (as in t) or by the facts the agent is aware of (as in s). The three depicted epistemic states, wherein she (from left to right) implicitly knows q, knows ¬q, or does not know whether q, are observationally indistinguishable for the agent: they are pawareness bisimilar. A p awareness bisimulation between (e.g.) the left and the right picture is
In Figure 2 , in state s agent i is aware of agent j and of fact p, and agent j is aware of facts p and q. In state u agent j is also aware of p and q. In s, agent i explicitly knows p and agent j explicitly knows p and q. That agent j is also aware of q in u leaves agent i indifferent, as she is not aware of q in s. The model rooted in state s is observationally equivalent ({p, q}-awareness bisimilar) to (e.g.) the model with root s ′ , where agent j is (obligatory) still aware of q in s ′ but (possibly) not aware of q in u ′ , and where q is still false in u ′ . But it is also observationally equivalent to the model with root s ′′ where the awareness for both agents remains the same but the value of q is now true, in u ′′ . The crucial aspect of awareness bisimulation is that j is in fact aware of q in state t but not from the perspective of i, whose access to state t is limited.
. Agent j's awareness of q in state t is inconsequential to agent i in state s, as i is not aware of q.
Language and semantics
We augment multi-agent epistemic logic with three new operators: A i ϕ, to mean that agent i is aware of al the concepts in ϕ; A + i cϕ for agent i becoming aware of concept (fact or agent) c, after which ϕ is true; and A − i cϕ for agent i forgetting concept c, after which ϕ is true. The construct K i ϕ, "agent i knows ϕ" stands in our case for "agent i intrinsically knows ϕ".
Definition 3 (Language). Given are a countably infinite set of propositional variables (facts) P , and a (disjoint) countably infinite set of agents N . The language L of individual local awareness is defined as
where i ∈ N , p ∈ P and c ∈ N ∪P . Implication →, disjunction ∨, and equivalence ↔ are defined by abbreviation. For ¬K i ¬ϕ we write L i ϕ.
The semantics of the awareness operator A i is purely syntax-based, namely using the free variables of a formula. These are defined as:
We explicitly include the formula ⊤ in the language, as the usual abbreviation p∨¬p complicates cases where not all agents are aware of p (an agent unaware of p would then not explicitly know truth). Unlike usual in multi-agent epistemic logic, we assume an infinite set of agents. This is because the agents can always become aware of yet another agent.
Definition 4 (Semantics
). Let M = (S, R, A, V ) be given. (M, s) |= ⊤ (M, s) |= p iff s ∈ V (p) (M, s) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M, s) |= ϕ and (M, s) |= ψ (M, s) |= ¬ϕ iff (M, s) |= ϕ (M, s) |= K i ϕ iff ∀t ∈ sR i , ∀(M ′ , t ′ ) ↔ Ai(s) (M, t), (M ′ , t ′ ) |= ϕ (M, s) |= A i ϕ iff v (ϕ) ⊆ A i (s) (M, s) |= A + i cϕ iff (M s →ic , s) |= ϕ (M, s) |= A − i cϕ iff (M s →ic , s) |= ϕ where M s →ic = (S, R, A∪{(i, (s, c))}, V ) and M s →ic = (S, R, A\{(i, (s, c))}, V ).
The set of validities (and the logic) is called DLILA (Dynamic Logic of Individual Local Awareness).
Intrinsic knowledge The main innovation in these semantics is the treatment of knowledge. An agent knows ϕ only if in all accessible states ϕ remains true for every possible interpretation of all concepts that she is unaware of. We achieve this by extending the agent's accessibility relation by composing it with bisimulation modulo those concepts of which the agent is unaware. This intrinsic knowledge is neither explicit nor implicit knowledge (see the next section).
In the semantics for K i ϕ first we access a possible world t and only then we compare observably indistinguishable states, but from the agent's perspective in the source state s, not in that target state t. This mirrors the corresponding crucial aspect of awareness bisimulation. Therefore, we have one K i operator in the logical language and not, instead, two independent operators, one for standard modal accessibility and another one for bisimulation quantification: the meaning of the quantifier only makes sense in the context of modal accessibility.
If the agent is aware of every concept in the formula ϕ, then the agent knows ϕ if for every world indistinguishable from the current world, for every epistemic awareness model bisimilar to that world with respect to all concepts in ϕ, we have that ϕ is true. If two worlds are bisimilar with respect to all concepts in ϕ, then the interpretation of ϕ in those two worlds is identical (see Proposition 3): in the presence of complete awareness the interpretation of knowledge is as for epistemic logic.
Awareness dynamics Compared to knowledge the semantics of becoming aware is deceptively simple. The full complexity of becoming aware can only be seen in the context of intrinsic knowledge. Suppose that the agent is unaware of p and that p is true in all accessible states. We then have that A + i pK i p is true: after the agent becomes aware of p, p is true. But although the agent considers that as a possibility, she does not know that, and she also considers it possible that after becoming aware of p, she knows that p is false, or that she is uncertain about p: all true are
KD45 and S5
Apart from the logic DLILA we also consider the logics DLILA L , where every modal operator K i satisfies the axioms of the logic L. Typical choices of L are S5 and KD45. One should be careful to note that this is not a simple case of restriction. Restricting the underlying logic to L (for example KD45) means that in interpreting the formula K i ϕ, we may only consider pointed models (M ′ , t ′ ) that satisfy the constraints of L (so transitive, serial and euclidean for KD45). The validities of DLILA L therefore do not necessarily extend those of DLILA. And indeed, each axiomatization also poses new problems.
Specific logics will also require us to vary the semantic interpretation of the operators A + i c and A − i c. We would like to ensure that changing an agent's awareness state in the current world does not affect knowledge in unexpected ways. For example, given awareness introspection and S5, we want a becoming aware operation that makes an agent aware of a concept in the current world and in every indistinguishable world. The intent of the A + i c and A − i c operators is that they execute the "smallest" change in the model that leaves the agent aware of the new concept. A simple way to enforce such a condition is to restrict the semantics to awareness models M where (S M , R M ) is a tree. We will refer to such a restriction as DLILA K , and this paper will present results for that logic. 
Proposition 4. Duality of becoming aware and forgetting: |=
The Figure 1 , and the roots of the models. In all three cases agent i knows that p. But she does not know in state s that q, because accessible state t is p awareness bisimilar to (e.g.) t ′ wherein q is false. After becoming aware of q in state s, she knows q: then, any state {p, q} awareness bisimilar to t must satisfy q. So A + i qK i q is true. Consider a KD45 extension of these models, i.e., add access (t, t) on the left, (t ′ , t ′ ) in the middle, and (t ′′ , t ′′ ), (t ′′ , t ′′′ ), (t ′′′ , t ′′ ), (t ′′′ , t ′′′ ) on the right. Now we have that the agent considers it possible that: after becoming aware of q, she knows that q, or she knows that ¬q, or she does not know whether q. 2. In Figure 2 , in state s, it is true that both agents know that p, and that agent j knows that q but agent i is unaware of p. Therefore i considers it possible that agent j is not aware of q:
Examples

Consider again
, and q ∈ A j (u ′ ). Still, if i becomes aware of q, she knows that j is aware of q, and she (mistakenly) believes that he incorrectly believes that q is false.
3. John knows the firewall is working. He is not aware of any new worm that may attack the system. However, he intrinsically knows that in any possible world where such a worm existed, the firewall would be working. This is captured by the validity
where f is the firewall is working and w is the worm is attacking the system. 4. Consider the case of DLILA KD45 , where every agent's accessibility relation is transitive, serial and euclidean. Crucially, in KD45, strong beliefs may be mistaken, but you do not consider that possible: to yourself, your beliefs appear knowledge. So L i (¬p∧K i p) is inconsistent. However, in DLILA KD45 it is valid that an agent i considers it possible that he becomes aware of a fact p that is false and that he believes to be true. That is nothing but speculating about becoming aware of false information that you had reason to accept! A validity of the language is
The interpretation of this formula is shown in Figure 3 . The crucial aspect is that the pair (s, t) ∈ R[∅] (the dashed line): agent i cannot a priori distinguish the reality of p being true in the believed world from the speculative option that p is false there but believed true. However, after becoming aware of p (in both s and t) this option is out of reach, as (s, t) ∈ R[p]. 
Intrinsic, explicit and implicit knowledge
Past literature on knowledge and awareness has focused on the difference between implicit knowledge ("knowing" something without being fully aware of that thing) and explicit knowledge ("knowing" something as well as being fully aware of that thing). Intrinsic knowledge is strictly weaker than explicit knowledge and strictly stronger than implicit knowledge. It allows us to reason about the process of becoming aware, and that is our reason to complicate the existing picture. Implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge are definable in our framework, and we can compare those definitions with the traditional definitions. 
means becoming aware of a finite set of concepts and is defined in the obvious way. We also have that
We emphasize that intrinsic knowledge is not definable in terms of implicit and explicit knowledge. Interaction between the three kinds of knowledge (obviously) includes:
On the other hand, |= K I i ϕ → K i ϕ (you can implicitly know that p but, as you are unaware of p, you do not intrinsically know that p), and |= K
as you may be unaware of yourself).
Explicit knowledge is the truest form of knowledge. It is the knowledge an agent is totally aware of. Implicit knowledge is the idealized form of knowledge. If proposition ϕ is true in every world an agent considers possible, then the agent implicitly knows ϕ even though she may be unaware of some of the concepts in ϕ. As ϕ is not in the agents language of discourse, the agent cannot access this information. If we were to speculate about the agent's interpretation of ϕ, we must assume that any worlds observationally indistinguishable to the agent for the concepts of which that agent is aware, are just as possible in the agent's perspective. This allows us to model how agents can perceive other agents becoming aware in the most general way.
Decidability
In this section we show decidability via an embedding into poly-modal logic. In this instance we will provide such an embedding for the logic DLILA K (the dynamic logic of individual local awareness over arbitrary epistemic relations) given the assumption that the poly-modal logic enjoys uniform interpolation with respect to both propositional atoms and actions (which, indeed, it does [1] ). Importantly though, the embedding given relies on only these assumptions. Therefore, for any variation in the semantics (say to DLILA S5 , where the knowledge relations are restricted to be partitions) the decidability result will hold provided poly-modal logic enjoys uniform interpolation with respect to atoms and actions over the underlying logic.
The embedding is given as follows. We assume the poly-modal logic has the syntax given by
Furthermore we may extend this syntax with bisimulation quantifiers, ∃xα and ∃iα, where the meaning of ∃cα is the uniform interpolant of α with respect to the atomic variables (atoms and agents) of α except c. As is shown in [1] , this interpolant is always expressible in poly-modal logic (and it may be computed). Furthermore, the formula ∃cα is satisfied by a pointed model (M, s) if and only if there is some pointed model (N, t), bisimilar to (M, s) except for c, such that N, t |= α.
Definition 6. Let ϕ be a given formula, and for every agent i ∈ v (ϕ) and for every concept c ∈ v (ϕ), let a i c be an atom not appearing in ϕ, (referred to as an awareness atom, where A ϕ is the set of awareness atoms for ϕ). The embedding of DLILA K into poly-modal logic is given by the recursive function α| ϕ such that: The proof is omitted. Thus we have translation from DLILA K to the modal poly-modal logic that preserves the meaning of formulas (given a set of awareness atoms in the model). Decidable satisfiability and model-checking follow. We have not yet the lower bound for complexity of the translation.
Axiomatization
Here we present an axiomatization for a simplified version of the logic, in that we will ignore awareness as it relates to agents (that is, whether one agent is aware of another). To this end we assume that all agents are aware of all other agents, and that they may not become unaware of any other agent. Correspondingly, we will restrict the syntax so that the operators A The initial set of axioms we consider for the logic DLILA K are broken up as follows. The knowledge axioms are: C0 All tautologies of propositional logic.
and the rules are:
We may optionally treat the awareness operator as an abbreviation, so the following axioms may not be necessary. However, we include them as they capture the properties we would expect awareness to satisfy. The awareness axioms simply capture the syntactic definition. Note that a number of these axioms are a consequence of the assumption that every agent is aware of every other agent. Without this assumption, A3, A4 and A6 would be implications rather than equivalences.
The interesting aspect of the logic DLILA K is the interaction between knowledge and awareness. This is reflected by the following rules and axioms:
Finally we are required to present axioms for becoming aware and forgetting. We note from the semantics that if an agent, i, becomes aware of an atom, or loses awareness of an atom, this will only affect the interpretation for formulas A i ϕ or K i ϕ. Consequently A 
We refer to this axiom system as DLILA K .
Soundness The soundness is generally straightforward. The axioms A1-A7 reflect the syntactic interpretation of the awareness operator. The axioms AK1 and AK2 capture the intrinsic nature of the knowledge operator: if an agent is unaware of an atom, he does not refute any interpretation of that atom, nor does he refute the interpretation of any agent's awareness of that atom. Finally the axioms B0-B7 show that the becoming aware and forgetting only impact the knowledge of the agent who becomes aware, and only his knowledge of the atom of which he became aware.
We note that the axioms AK1 and AK2 are not sound for the logic DLILA S5 . For example, if ϕ = L i p, then every agent intrinsically knows that p → L i p, but this is not enough to infer K i L i p. However, as DLILA K is not intrinsically reflexive, these axioms are sound. It is also interesting to note that the axioms:
are not required in the completeness proof, even though they can be shown to be sound for all restrictions of DLILA. The completeness proof shows that in the non-transitive setting of DLILA K the axioms AK1 and AK2 are sufficient to capture the intrinsic aspect of the knowledge operator.
Completeness We can give a completeness proof for the above axioms by showing that we can construct a canonical model for any formula using the maximal consistent sets of formulas in the language DLILA K .
Definition 7.
The canonical model is built from the set of all maximal consistent sets S of formulas with respect to the system DLILA K . Further we define M = (S, R, A, V) where: -for all i ∈ N , for all σ, τ ∈ S, (σ, τ ) ∈ R i if and only if for all formulas K I i ϕ ∈ σ, we have ϕ ∈ τ . -for all σ ∈ S for all i ∈ N , for all p ∈ P , we have p ∈ A i (σ) if and only if
-for all σ ∈ S, for all p ∈ P , we have σ ∈ V(p) if and only if p ∈ σ.
The proof of completeness will proceed by providing the truth lemma. That is, for every σ ∈ S, for every ϕ ∈ σ we have M, σ |= ϕ, so every consistent formula is satisfiable. Note, as we are working with DLILA K , that we are actually working with the tree unwinding of M, but this is a technical issue that is only relevant in the interpretation of A + and A − . For convenience, we give a syntactic version of the awareness bisimulation.
Definition 8.
We say a formula of DLILA K is explicit if it is built from the following syntax:
For every C ⊆ P , let B(C) be a binary relation on S satisfying for all σ, τ ∈ S, (σ, τ ) ∈ B(C) if and only if for every explicit formula ϕ containing only the atoms in C, we have we have ϕ ∈ σ implies ϕ ∈ τ . (We refer to such formulas ϕ as C-explicit).
The following lemma (proof omitted) is a strengthening of Proposition 3 and shows the correspondence between Definition 8 and Definition 2 (disregarding the awareness of agents as concepts).
Lemma 2. For every σ, τ ∈ S, for every C ⊆ P we have (M, σ) ↔ C (M, τ ) if and only if (σ, τ ) ∈ B(C).
We note that Lemma 2 provides a compelling justification for the notion of awareness bisimulation. Two states are C-awareness bisimilar exactly when they agree on all C-explicit formulas.
Lemma 3 (Truth Lemma).
For every σ ∈ S, for every formula ϕ, we have ϕ ∈ σ if and only if M, σ |= ϕ.
This proof is also omitted. It uses Lemma 2. It follows that for every consistent formula ϕ we may construct a model so the axioms system DLILA K is complete for the logic DLILA K .
Comparison
We consider multi-K structures, i.e., any accessibility relation, whereas [2] assume KD45 epistemic relations and [9] assume (implicitly) multi-S5. Our multi-K choice facilitates some of the theoretical results, such as the proof of decidability. This is not just an advantage. If we restrict the bisimulation operation used to interpret knowledge to specific model classes, such as KD45 or S5, decidability has to be proved anew, and the axiomatization has to be reconsidered as well.
For propositional variables our awareness function is the most general (semantic) choice, as in [2] . Awareness of agents is not found in the literature in this tradition, to our knowledge.
Our approach is in some respects simpler and more constrained than [9] . From the epistemic awareness structure we are able to implicitly derive a complete lattice of spaces via awareness bisimulation, whereas in [9] this structure is given explicitly. In other words, we have a succinct, technical tool to derive that result. and columns p, q and p, ¬q in S {p,q} are both linked to the single possibility in row jp and column p in S {p} . We would say that the latter represents the R[p]-equivalence class that contains the two former: if the agent is unaware of q, it is compatible with this level of awareness that q is true but also that q is false. Similarly, in this figure, the single possibility ∅ represents the R[∅]-equivalence class of the four possibilities in the bottom row of S {p,q} , and, if there were only one atom in the language, the R[∅]-equivalence class of the two possibilities in the bottom row of S {p} , etc.
We now compare some of our axioms with those given in [9, 7] (for our semantic modelling of awareness, the latter seems a better reference for the axiomatics than the initial [2] ). The principles A1, . . . , A7 straightforwardly correspond to (a multi-agent version of) L KXA in [7] and Proposition 3 in [9] -note that the epistemic operators K in A1, . . . , A3 are in the scope of awareness operators so can be replaced by the explicit knowledge operators K E assumed by those authors. Further, A5 is derivable from A3 and A4 and modus ponens, and A6 is a 'mix' axiom relating to dynamics. Principles AK1 and AK2 were conceived using results for bisimulation quantified logics and are strictly about intrinsic knowledge only. Because we also consider awareness of agents, the anticipated further generalization of our axiomatics will lack principles such as A i ϕ → A i A i ϕ and (therefore) A i ϕ → A i K i ϕ: these only holds under conditions of self-awareness! Although we do not explicitly have propositional quantifiers, they are indirectly present in intrinsic knowledge operators. Propositional quantification is integrated with awareness and knowledge in [8] (and in various precursors). This concerns quantification over the set of formulas of which an agent is aware. They interestingly mention that "Using semantic valuations [for quantification] does not work in the presence of awareness" [8, p.506] ; although of course correct, we are wondering if our work may make the authors reconsider the suggested scope of that remark. Dynamics of (factual) awareness is also presented in [10] and in [6] . In the former, becoming aware means (initially) becoming ignorant about that proposition. It uses an algebraic approach. In the latter, the approach in Section 3 is similarly dynamic modal as ours, and it provides an interestingly integrated combination of syntactic and semantic awareness.
